Embedded security does not stand still. The threat landscape that engineers design against today is materially different from the one that existed when the Mirai botnet demonstrated in 2016 that
Embedded security does not stand still. The threat landscape that engineers design against today is materially different from the one that existed when the Mirai botnet demonstrated in 2016 that
The majority of embedded device security incidents are caused by a small, well-documented set of avoidable mistakes: hardcoded credentials, unvalidated inputs, broken cryptography, open debug interfaces left enabled in production,
Embedded security testing spans four disciplines that each require their own toolset: static and dynamic code analysis to find vulnerabilities before firmware ships, hardware attack tools to test the physical
The firmware update mechanism is simultaneously the most important security capability in a deployed embedded device and one of the most dangerous attack surfaces it exposes. A robust OTA (Over-the-Air)
Detecting and responding to attacks on embedded devices is a fundamentally different discipline from IT security operations. Embedded devices cannot run endpoint detection agents, have kilobytes rather than gigabytes of
A vulnerability found in production firmware costs ten to a hundred times more to fix than the same vulnerability found during design or code review. For embedded devices already in
Network communication is the attack surface exploited in the majority of large-scale IoT compromises. Mirai, the botnet that took down a large portion of internet infrastructure in 2016, spread entirely
Software security controls are only as strong as the hardware layer beneath them. An attacker who can bypass the boot sequence, read flash directly or inject a voltage glitch to
Secure embedded software development is not a checklist you run at the end of a project. It is a discipline applied to every function, every memory allocation and every build
The most common embedded system vulnerabilities are not exotic zero-days. They are repeating patterns: buffer overflows from unsafe C functions, credentials compiled directly into firmware, debug ports left open on






